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Abstract
This paper provides evidence from Internet-based, large-scale survey data of hy-
pothetical choice experiment on the relative utility hypothesis. The methodology
exploited here complements previous empirical results from happiness studies, in-
centivized choice experiment studies, and neuroscience studies in such a way that
methodological problems among previous studies within these ¯elds are resolved.
We show that not only the intensity but also the distribution of relative utility
are di®erent across speci¯c comparison benchmarks (internal reference group), and
across types of reference groups people are facing in the experiments (external refer-
ence group). The relative utility e®ect among Japanese respondents, while shown to
exist in the form of jealousy, is found to be not as strong as can validate the East-
erlin paradox. Comparison benchmark with daily contacts is related to stronger
jealousy. We also provide empirical evidence, which nuances that the reference
group is chosen endogenously.
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1 Introduction
Traditional economic theories focus on the role of absolute income/consumption, whereas
behavioral evidence suggests that social comparisons in°uence well-being and decisions
(Fliessbach et al. 2007, p1305). Whether social comparison a®ects individual utility is
of key importance for understanding human behavior in any social context, and in un-
derstanding asset pricings, which are the consequences of human interactions in markets.
This study provides new evidence of social comparison from a hypothetical choice exper-
iment, especially focusing on the distribution of social comparison e®ect. In doing so, we
take account of di®erences in comparison benchmarks, which subjects perceive in mind
(internal reference group), and in comparison targets, which subjects face in experiments
(external reference group).
In the literature of happiness study, a seminal paper of Easterlin (1974) argued using
individual-level surveys between 1946 and 1970 that although income per capita rose
steadily in the United States during this period, average reported happiness showed no
increasing trend and even declined between 1960 and 1970. Easterlin (1974, 1995, 2001)
explained this paradox by alluding to Duesenberry's relative utility theory (Duesenberry
1949), which suggests that people often compare themselves to a reference group, and so
they care not only about their own absolute consumption levels, but about how much
they consume relative to that benchmark.
The Easterlin paradox prompted the literature of economics of happiness to investi-
gate further the impact of absolute and relative income on subjective well-being measures.
The majority of these studies, headed by van de Stadt et al. (1985) and Clark and Oswald
(1996), found a negative relationship between satisfaction and various comparison in-
come variables. The view that increasing the income of all increases the happiness of
no one has been shared among studies such as McBride (2001), Luttmer (2005), and
Clark et al. (2008). On the other hand, there are studies observing a relative-income ef-
fect that is either relatively smaller in absolute value or statistically insigni¯cant such as
Sloane and Williams (2000), Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005), Blanch°ower and Oswald (2004),
and Brown et al. (2008). Recently, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) thoroughly re-examined
data sets previously exploited in happiness studies, and provided a conclusion that data
indicated a clear role for absolute income and a more limited role for relative income com-
parisons in determining happiness. These mixed results from happiness studies clearly
call for further evidence on the relative utility hypothesis.
A crucial matter in empirical studies of relative utility is how to de¯ne and collect
information about an appropriate reference person (or groups) for each subject; the pos-
sibilities, including the average (representative) person in society - colleagues, friends,
family, neighbors, and so forth - are endless. Majority of previous studies along the line
of happiness study assumed that the reference groups were de¯ned by some social av-
erages. However, this proxy of reference income may be problematic, since the social
average may not be a salient reference group for subjects. Some papers tried to over-
come this drawback by considering other plausible reference groups, and examples of such
studies include: reference group of work places (Cappelli and Sherer 1988; Brown et al.
2008; Clark et al. 2009b), neighbors (Luttmer 2005; Clark et al. 2009a; Knight et al. 2009;
Senik 2009) and friends and family members (Senik 2009). Senik (2009) considered various
reference groups at the same time, and showed that local comparisons to one's parents,
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former colleagues or high school mates are more powerful than self-ranking in the social
ladder.
A recent prominent progress from the happiness literature is that Clark and Senik
(2010) investigated on the issue of individual speci¯c comparison benchmark, using data of
who compares to whom?. Their ¯nding was that the intensity of social comparison changes
in combination with speci¯c groups that people ascribe to their comparison benchmarks.
For example, those who think that their reference group is friend tend to compare more
than those whose comparison benchmark group is work colleague do.
Despite the recent development Clark and Senik (2010), studies along the line of hap-
piness study approach encompassed other shared problems, which call for new tests on
the Easterlin paradox with other research methodologies. One problem is that proxies of
reference income used in empirical tests of happiness studies were imposed on subjects
by an econometrician, since usually information regarding direct and cardinal measures
of reference income was missing.1 Another more minor issue among happiness studies
is the use of subjective well-being (SWB) information as a proxy of utility in happi-
ness regressions. There has been debates about the nature of SWB, since researchers
have not been sure whether it represents cardinal or ordinal utility (van Praag 1991,
Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters 2004). Also, SWB measures of respondents will be in°u-
enced by many aspects of their life, including individual characteristics and mood on
the day of the survey (Kahneman et al. 2006).2 Hence, it is bene¯cial if we re-examine
¯ndings from happiness studies on the relative utility hypothesis with empirical tests in
which direct measures of reference income of valid comparison benchmarks are available,
and in which we do not need to rely on SWB measures as a proxy of utility.
Possible complementary research agenda for happiness study on the relative utility
hypothesis is actually threefold. The ¯rst agenda is incentivized choice experiments
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Fehr and Schmidt 2006). Laboratory experiments have found
evidence of the asymmetric inequality aversion, which re°ects concerns for relative pay-
o®. The second approach is neurosciences. The recent developments in neuroscience
have clari¯ed the brain mechanism of social preferences, which can be considered to be a
hard-scienti¯c micro-foundation for the relative utility hypothesis (Fliessbach et al. 2007,
Fehr and Camerer 2007, Tricomi et al. 2010). With these methodologies, researchers can
obtain more direct evidence of relative utility than the one gathered in happiness studies,
since reference groups in these laboratory experiments are well de¯ned (typically, coupled
persons in the experiments), and the levels of income/reward to comparison benchmark
persons are explicitly shown to the subjects. Nevertheless, these methodologies encom-
pass a drawback: namely, that it may be di±cult to generalize ¯ndings from multiple
person and incentivized choice experiments, and ones from functional MRI studies with
relatively small real rewards, to a social setting such as the Easterlin paradox. Also, the
1As far as we notice, the only exception in the literature of happiness study that has information
of direct and cardinal measure of reference income is de la Garza et al. (2009). Knight et al. (2009)
and Senik (2009) exploited information on perceptions of relative position in respondents' villages or in
friends/family members. However, their proxies of relative comparisons were ordinal, so that interpreta-
tions of the magnitudes of coe±cients for comparison e®ects were not straightforward in examining the
Easterlin paradox.
2Some researchers such as Hollander (2001), Kahneman and Krueger (2006) argue that a consensus
on the validity of SWB as a proxy of utility has been attained.
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subjects who participated in most of these experiments were college students, being stan-
dard practice in neurosciences, as well as behavioral and experimental economics. Finally,
it is not clear if coupled persons in laboratory experiments are salient reference persons in
subjects' lives. These are sources of concern when we want to interpret the results from
these research methodologies as being socially representative.
However, the third alternative methodology of hypothetical choice experiments is able
to overcome these issues, and is a nice complement for the other techniques. A ¯rst
merit of hypothetical choice experiments is that we can collect a lot of information, which
could amount to a socially representative data set that is absent in incentivized choice
experiment studies and neuroscience studies. Another merit of hypothetical choice ex-
periments in testing the relative utility hypothesis is that information about comparison
reference groups and direct measures of reference income is available to subjects, which is
likewise present in incentivized choice experiments and neuroscience studies, but absent
in happiness studies. Similar to Clark and Senik (2010), we gathered information about
each subject's relevant comparison benchmark, and we examined if the intensity of rela-
tive utility changes in combination with speci¯c comparison benchmark that respondents
perceive, and with types of reference groups that people are facing. Finally, in hypothet-
ical choice experiments, happiness measures are not necessary in estimating the intensity
and sign of the relative utility e®ects, and hence, we can avoid suspicion on validities of
empirical results arising from use of SWB measures.3 Despite these merits, we recognize
that our preferred methodology of hypothetical choice experiments also contains problems
that can bias estimates of relative utility e®ects. We will discuss the issue in detail later.
Similar to the present analysis, Solnick and Hemenway (1998); Johansson-Stenman et al.
(2002); Alpizar et al. (2005) and Carlsson et al. (2007) investigated the intensity of social
comparisons by estimating the degrees of positionality using data of hypothetical choice
experiments.4 These studies, however, considered that reference incomes were merely the
national average income levels. Another issue among them is that the format of choice was
designed in such a way that respondents made iterative choices to get them to a point
of indi®erence. This choice experiment strategy is known to encompass severe biases,
as pointed out by Carson (1991) and Arrow et al. (1993), who suggested use of discrete
choice experiment of the sort conducted in this study for less severe bias and easier un-
derstanding of the questionnaire. Also, degree of positionality inferred by the previous
studies encompassed measurement errors, since assigned value of degree of positionality
for each point of indi®erence was given arbitrarily. The results in these studies concluded
that relative income, on average, is about as important as absolute income at the margin
(p.53, Carlsson et al. 2009), meaning that the Easterlin paradox is valid.
We have found just one paper of Carlsson et al. (2009) in which a hypothetical and
discrete choice experiment on relative utility was conducted. Carlsson et al. (2009) con-
sidered changes in intensity of relative utility across di®erent reference groups. With
face-to-face surveys from 498 college students, they analyzed social comparisons in the
caste system in India. They focused on two caste classes, and the importance of relative
3One last merit of hypothetical choice experiments over happiness regressions would be that when
we quantify the intensity and sign of relative utility, we can ¯x all non-essential variables other than
attributes in hypothetical choice experiments.
4Respondents in Solnick and Hemenway (1998); Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), and Alpizar et al.
(2005) were students when Carlsson et al. (2007) has given the social representative survey.
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income within and between castes was examined. Because caste membership is hereditary
and cannot be changed in India, these reference groups are considered to be exogenous.
On the other hand, Clark et al. (2008) argued that despite limited empirical evidence in
economics, reference groups will be chosen endogenously, possibly as groups of people's
close contacts.5 This suggestion motivates studies in which we consider reference groups
in a more general setting, since societies are not usually as clearly divided as they are
in India, where the caste system culture still remains. It is obvious that a good starting
point in thinking about this issue is to consider reference groups of colleagues, friends,
family, and neighbors - all of which were the focus of recent happiness studies of Senik
(2009) and Clark and Senik (2010).
All in all, it is bene¯cial that we conduct a hypothetical choice experiment study of
relative utility in which di®erent types of reference groups and subject-speci¯c compari-
son benchmarks are considered, and information on direct measures of reference income
level is explicitly given to subjects. Our large survey with subjects of various socio-
economic characteristics can be nationally representative, which is bene¯cial to investigate
the Easterlin paradox. In this study, similarly to Clark and Senik (2010), we investigate
how people change their comparison behavior (intensity and sign of social comparison)
in combination with speci¯c comparison benchmarks. Similar to Senik (2009), the di®er-
ence of intensity of relative utility across di®erent types of external reference groups is also
examined. We also provide empirical evidence, which suggests that reference groups are
chosen endogenously using a nested logit model framework. Our results from hypothetical
choice experiments complement previous ¯ndings on relative utility from other research
methodologies. Detailed explanations of our choice tasks are documented in Section 3.2.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our data, explains how they
were collected and draws attention to possible biases. Section 3 presents the construction
of the questionnaire. Section 4 introduces empirical framework to test the relative utility
hypothesis, and then shows the results. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks and
suggests directions for further research.
2 Data
2.1 Research company
Our data set is taken from an original Web-based survey conducted in March 2010.6 A
Japanese consumer monitoring company, Nikkei Research Inc., conducted the survey; as
part of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun Group (NIKKEI), it is known to be trustworthy for
academic research purposes among Japanese research companies. In order to provide
highly reliable research data, its registered subjects are subject to monthly screenings,
5An exceptional economics study, which provided evidence of endogenous determination of reference
group is Falk and Knell (2004). They argued that reference standards are devices to serve motives of
self-improvement and self-enhancement. They empirically showed that reference standards increase in
individuals' abilities, and that people thus tend to compare themselves to similar others for the purpose
of self-improvement.
6The use of the Internet for social surveys is new and is becoming increasingly active. Examples of
recent studies with web-based surveys include Viscusi et al. (2008), Ida and Goto (2009), Olsen (2009),
and Bech et al. (2010).
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which keep information up to date and exclude double registrations. The total number
of registered subjects in the Nikkei Database is around 160,000. Incentives for respon-
dents are provided by cash voucher, rather than by points; point incentive is biased, as
particular respondents with points tend to answer. The research period is one week in
our experiment, and only those subjects who can access the Internet during the weekend
can join the survey. This is a sharp contrast with one-day research, which other research
companies usually adapt for cost advantage, since with one-day research, subjects are
chosen on a ¯rst-come basis, causing a bias. All these, and other techniques, allow data
to be collected in such a way that it is as valid as possible.
2.2 Collection of data
In the survey, 60,482 Japanese subjects between the ages of 20 and 65 were chosen with
strati¯ed random sampling from the Nikkei Database, such that the cohort pro¯le of our
sample mirrored the Japanese census statistics. 14,370 subjects completed the survey.
This response rate of 23.8 percent looks rather low; however, it should be noted that the
un-weighted average of the response rates for similar academic conjoint surveys conducted
by the same company in 2008 and 2009 (7 projects) is 28.8 percent. The low response rate
is a source of concern, as is this de¯ciency of web-based surveys that is absent in face-to-
face survey studies such as Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Johansson-Stenman et al.
(2002). Nonetheless, we proceed with data from a web-based survey with an apparent
merit that we can collect a large number of samples that cover varieties of individual
characteristics from throughout Japan. As is documented below, we ¯nd that our data
set captures signi¯cant features of the Japanese people, which is di±cult to pursue with
small sample, face-to-face surveys.7
Because of the low response rate, in table 1, we present a comparison of the sample
characteristics to overall statistics for the Japanese population. In Columns (1) and (2),
we present descriptive statistics for our sample. Column (1) is for the whole sample
and Column (2) is for our study sample, the construction of which is documented below.
Column (3) illustrates the feature of Nikkei Database, and the last column shows national
statistics.
Since the strati¯ed random sampling was designed to mirror the population cohort
pro¯le of Japanese census statistics, the age and gender structures of our sample look
quite comparable to national statistics. Women account for slightly more than 50 percent
of the entire sample in our data set and in the national data set. Regarding marital status,
female subjects those who divorced or separated seem under-sampled. This discrepancy
from national statistics happened because the national data accounts for everyone who
is over 15 in making the statistics. Since the average length of life for Japanese women
is as high as around 87 (with that of men around 78), women tend to be separated at a
¯nal phase of their lives, which raised the rate of female divorce/separation in national
statistics. On the other hand, in our data set, we do not include those who are older than
70, so that the rates of divorce/separation for males and females are lower than national
statistics.
7As documented in Ida and Kuroda (2006), broadband Internet services are pervasive in Japan com-
pared to other countries, thus the sample selection problem from a web-based survey will not be serious.
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With respect to educational record, in our male samples, just one percent of the sample
completed middle school only, 18 percent completed high school, 10 percent pursued
more advanced studies in some college, and the remaining 70 percent of the sample holds
college or grad degrees. This high-education biased distribution holds for female samples.
This is an obvious over-sampling of better-educated participants, probably re°ecting the
digital divide of lower-educated people. As with lower-educated people, students and the
unemployed are also under-sampled, while the discrepancies from national statistics for
them do not look so severe. The reasons are not very clear, but we guess that these are also
re°ections of some digital divide among them. Finally, information on residence areas is
compared. There is a clear over-sampling from the Kanto region, which includes Tokyo.
Also, people from the Kansai region, which contains Osaka, are slightly over-sampled.
Similiar to the case of educational record, those who are living in urban cities seem to
have easier access to the Internet, which will be the reason for this bias.
Hence, in our data set, bias arose with respect to educational background and residence
area. At this stage, the direction of bias for relative utility e®ect is actually not very
clear. People may acquire higher ethics through pursuits of higher education and they
may become altruistic toward others, as argued in Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002). At
the same time, those who have higher academic backgrounds tend to earn more, which in
turn, can end up with raising pecuniary jealousy in the search for higher status. Japanese
people living in urban cities are nowadays said to be indi®erent to their neighbors, and
this indi®erent attitude will make social comparison less meaningful. On the other hand,
they have higher frequency of encountering others, which may raise the feeling of rivalry.
Having said this, if evidence from Europe can be applicable to our Japanese data set,
Clark and Senik (2010) showed that those who have Internet access, city dwellers, and
those with higher educational backgrounds are more comparison conscious. Hence, our
data set may capture the upper bound of the intensity of relative utility.8
All in all, this study does not intend to provide an accurate depiction of the repre-
sentative Japanese people, since our sample is limited to registered subjects of Nikkei
Database, and since the direction of possible biases in estimating relative utility e®ects
is not very clear, as described above. This means that the results below may not be
generalizable to the entire Japanese population; for instance, our dataset does not cover
those who ¯nished middle school only. Nonetheless, due to the large size of our sample,
the breadth of all of 47 prefectures across Japan, and a variety of socio-economic back
grounds, we believe that this dataset does capture signi¯cant features of the Japanese
people.9
8See Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) for discussions of other potential biases, including purchase of
moral satisfaction (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), associated with hypothetical choice experiments of
relative utility.
9Kuriyama (2008) argued that biases from hypothetical choice experiments may not be so severe, since
for subjects, it is di±cult to strategize within a short time-span of surveys, and since subjects usually
recognize that their strategized answers do not have much impact on the main results of the survey when
the number of observations is large.
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2.3 Construction of study sample
One clear de¯ciency for the web-based survey is that researchers cannot eagerly monitor
and encourage subjects to participate in the survey. Especially, when subjects do not have
a clear understanding of the meanings of questions or backgrounds of the survey, they will
try to complete questions as quickly as possible by making up answers without contem-
plation. Our research company tries to minimize this motivation by making the research
fee pay on a lottery basis: not all of the respondents can earn a reward so that those who
join only for reward purposes are encouraged not to take part in the survey.10 This scheme
reduces response rate, while it will increase the validity of data when collected. Further-
more, at the beginning of the survey, we stated that the survey is designed for revealing
comparison consciousness with academic purposes. This strategy is di®erent from behind
the veil of ignorance scheme employed by studies such as Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002)
and Alpizar et al. (2005), who conducted face-to-face surveys with college students. We
realize that our preferred strategy causes bias in pushing subjects toward being compar-
ison conscious, but later we will show that even with this bias and one from the sample
selection documented above, the comparison e®ect in Japan is not so strong as to validate
the famous Easterlin paradox.
A good way to monitor subjects' willingness to participate in the survey is to look
at elapsed time in completing the survey. If elapsed time is too short for a subject, it is
obvious that he completed the survey without contemplation, and it is plausible that he
just wanted to join the lottery for the research reward. The average investigation time
to ¯nish the survey was 9 minutes 9 seconds in this survey, with the median value of 6
minutes 5 seconds. In ¯gure 1, we show the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for
our whole sample as sample (1).11 For subjects, the easiest way to ¯nish the survey is
to provide the same answers for conjoint questions documented below. In this survey, we
conduct three types of choice tasks, and subjects are required to answer ¯ve consecutive
questions for each task. We eliminated those who provided the same number for all ¯ve
questions in any tasks (2,218). The CDF of elapsed time for the remaining respondents are
reported in ¯gure 1 as sample (2). The ¯gure clearly shows that those who provided the
same answers through ¯ve consecutive questions in a task tended to ¯nish the survey very
quickly, probably without contemplation. We also discard the information of subjects
whose elapsed time is shorter than four minutes (968), given feedbacks from a within
company pilot test by NIKKEI. So far, we are left with 10,988 respondents.
Next, the observations dropped either missed information for some of the variables used
in the empirical analysis below (219), or contained an inconsistency of retirement before
the age of 55 (1). Finally, we deleted samples who report their personal annual pre-tax
income in 2009 to be higher than twelve million Japanese Yen (565).12 To ensure that this
10At the beginning of the questions, respondents were told that in total, 800 subjects will win the
lottery and the reward is JPY500 for each person.
11Observations with no time records (90) and elapsed time longer than 60 minutes (106) are excluded
from our study sample.
12The cut-o® point, JPY12 million, is higher than the sum of the average of personal pre-tax annual
income and 3 standard deviations of the income distribution. There will be two major reasons for the
high frequency of high-income level subjects. One reason is that subjects are biased to those with higher
education, Internet access, and city dwellers. It is natural that those individuals acquire more income
than those who are not. The other reason is that they tried to "cheat" with respect to their income levels.
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cut with income variable was not due to sample selection, we compared the observations
in the two groups along di®erent dimensions including age, education, marital status, and
residence area. We are happy to report that this drop in the number of observations in
our working sample does not seem to be due to a sample selection problem. At this ¯nal
stage, we are left with 10,203 respondents. The above cuts, which amounted in total to
30 percent of our whole sample, were done because we would like to proceed with high-
quality data. It is, however, probably fortunate for us that the main results documented
below remain qualitatively unchanged when we use the whole sample as our study sample.
3 Data description
The survey consisted of three sections. The ¯rst section was a warm-up in which re-
spondents answered one question of satisfaction about their levels of income, and two
questions of social comparisons. Because these warm-up questions are followed by the
hypothetical choice tasks in the second part of the survey, it is likely that the question
order makes individuals more comparison-conscious. We proceeded with this ordering,
since researchers cannot encourage subjects on site for web-based surveys, and if subjects
had been kept in the dark about the study's topic, they would have lost concentration in
answering conjoint questions, making the data set less valid.13 Hence, again, this study
will capture the upper bound of the intensity of relative utility e®ects. The last part of
the survey consisted of questions about individual characteristics, including age, sex, ed-
ucational background, job, marital status, types of residence, residence area, and annual
pre-tax personal income in 2009. Part of descriptive statistics is presented in table 1.
3.1 Warm-up questions
In the ¯rst warm-up question, respondents are asked to choose one of ¯ve possible cate-
gories to provide information on their own levels of satisfaction about income. Category
1 corresponds to "least satis¯ed," while category 5 denotes "most satis¯ed". The second
question was related to social comparison and was phrased as "How much do you care
about others' income levels?". The respondents were asked to choose from ¯ve response
options, where 1 corresponded to "do not care at all," and 5 denoted "care very much".
The second question concerned the respondent's de¯nition of their reference group. They
were asked to choose one category, from those applicable to them, as their reference group
among (i) family, (ii) neighbors, (iii) friends, (iv) colleagues, (v) do not care, and (vi) oth-
ers. From these last two questions, we can see "who compares to whom?" and "how
much?", which was investigated in depth in a framework of happiness study for European
countries by Clark and Senik (2010).
Table 2 shows the distribution of the reference groups chosen by the respondents.
We can see that the most often cited reference group is friend, followed by work col-
As it is documented in the text, we found that deletion of those high-income subjects is not related to
sample selection issue. With the exchange rate in March 2009, 12 million Japanese Yen is around 130,000
US dollars.
13Face-to-face surveys such as Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Alpizar et al. (2005) followed the
behind the veil of ignorance strategy.
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league. These rankings are opposite to those in Europe countries, as documented in
Clark and Senik (2010), but it is interesting that both in Europe and in Japan, those two
groups are the most important reference groups. Reference groups of family and neigh-
bor play minor roles, and these ¯ndings are exploited in setting our hypothetical choice
experiment in Section 3.2.3.14 In our data set, one-fourth of subjects answer that they do
not have comparison groups. This ¯gure is lower than the one for European countries, as
found by Clark and Senik (2010).
Table 3 shows the cross-tabulation of the distribution of reference groups and the
intensity of social comparison. The table suggests that those who do not think that
comparison is important tend not to have comparison groups, which is natural. Those
who declare that their reference groups are family, neighbors, or colleagues tend to think
that comparison is more important than respondents whose reference groups are friends
do. This intriguing pattern of intensity of social comparison among those who think that
their reference groups are friends is further discussed in Section 3.2.3, where we compare
the reference groups of friend and work colleague.
3.2 Conjoint questions
Our research strategy was to elicit respondents' preference toward social comparison
through hypothetical choice experiments (stated preference method). Among some of
the previous theoretical studies on preference externalities, such as Futagami and Shibata
(1998), it was assumed that people care about relative amount of wealth, that is, a stock
variable. However, in our survey, in order to avoid the complexities involved in inter-
temporal economic decision-making, we concentrate on the intra-temporal aspect of social
comparison. Speci¯cally, we consider pre-tax monthly income levels as our attributes. In
choice tasks, the respondents make choices among presented di®erent situations. Situa-
tions are described by their own income, income of reference group, and the characteristics
of the reference group.
As documented in Section 1, we would like to investigate how people change their
comparison behavior (intensity and sign of social comparison) across di®erent reference
groups. Like Clark and Senik (2010), we also see if the intensity and the sign of relative
comparison e®ects are a®ected by reference groups that subjects have in mind, which is
done by exploiting "who compares to whom" information obtained in one of the warm-up
questions. Finally, we also would like to investigate if reference groups are determined
endogenously, probably in accordance with the frequency of daily contacts. This is done
in a nested logit model framework. In order to pursue these issues, we conducted the
following three hypothetical choice tasks in the survey.
3.2.1 Representative agent task
The ¯rst task is a benchmark task and we call it representative agent task. The speci¯-
cation here is that the reference group is given by "some representative person in society
(Japan)," a de¯nition which is often used in previous empirical and theoretical studies.
14We conducted a pre-test and found the same pattern of the distribution of reference groups. We then
designed the questions used in conjoint analyses, which take into account di®erences in reference groups.
For detail, see the conjoint questions explained below.
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Despite its simplicity, this task will provide a useful benchmark in investigating if the
Easterlin paradox is valid when a reference group is explicitly given to subjects in the
questionnaire. This task is also useful for theoretical macroeconomists. Previous theoret-
ical studies were usually conducted without estimating important parameters of relative
utility. And these put forward various propositions in accordance with the parameters
assumed. Parameters estimated in this study will be of help for the reality of their policy
implications.
In each choice situation, the respondents make a choice among three options: (i) situ-
ation 1, (ii) situation 2, and (iii) do not know/ cannot answer. We provided the no-choice
options because of a suggestion by Arrow et al. (1993) and Haaijer et al. (2001), who
pointed out the importance of including the no-choice option in hypothetical choice ex-
periments. We then removed observations in which the no-choice option (3) was selected
from our regressions. An alternative way of coping with those observations is to interpret
them as showing indi®erence between the two situations, rather than a failure to under-
stand the survey question. Unfortunately, we have no information of the true reason why
no-option was chosen. Hence, following the literature, we see the results of the ¯rst choice
in each choice task for a robustness check. It was shown that results presented below are
robust (not shown here due to space constraints, but available upon request). The above
procedure applies to empirical tests on the following tasks, as well.
At the beginning of this task, respondents are told to "In the following ¯gures, pairs
of your monthly pre-tax income, and that of reference persons are presented. Imagine
that each set of your income pro¯le and the other's income pro¯le regulates the society's
socio-economic situations." The reference group in this task is described by the Japanese
social average. To ease the understandings of respondents, we provided them with ¯gure
images.15 Situations are described by two attributes of one's own monthly pre-tax income
and the monthly pre-tax income of the reference group. It was also repeatedly stressed
that price levels were the same in these two situations, and that the respondents are asked
to choose the situation that would be best for their own interests.16
Respondents repeat ¯ve situation choices, which are de¯ned along these two dimen-
sions. After three pretests, we determined the levels of these attributes and the survey
included the following situation variations: JPY 180 thousands, JPY 240 thousands, JPY
400 thousands, JPY 640 thousands, and JPY 900 thousands for each dimension. Since
we have two attributes and ¯ve levels for each attribute, there are 25 potential variations
15It is obvious that ¯gure images helped respondents understand the meaning of the questionnaire of
social comparison. After pretests, in which everything was explained in sentences, we found that cognitive
burdens associated with understanding the questionnaires of choice experiments were not negligible. This
could be con¯rmed from estimated standard deviations in logit regressions, which re°ected the variances of
choice patterns; these variances partly re°ect less-clear understanding of questionnaires by the subjects.
We then decided to provide ¯gure images in the ¯nal test, which halved the average elapsed time to
complete the survey, and reduced the standard deviations of logit estimations.
16In Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Alpizar et al. (2005), and Carlsson et al. (2007), respondents
are asked to consider the well-being of o®spring, rather than their own. This framing was used in order
to help the respondents liberate themselves from their current circumstances. In this study, we asked
about respondents' own interests, since we would like to know the current situations within Japanese
society. Parameters thus estimated will be more useful for drawing current policy implications. Also, we
can control individual ¯xed e®ects, as we asked respondents to make repeated, ¯ve situation choices for
each task, thereby interpreting the data as panel.
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in an alternative. In choice experiments, two alternatives are paired to form choice sets,
and the pairing strategy is the researcher's choice to determine. As is documented in
Viscusi et al. (2008), the choice design should be paired so as to balance the utility of
each alternative.17 In the choice experiment of relative utility, however, it does not nec-
essarily mean that an increase in a reference group's income leads to decline in one's own
utility level; in such, we did not exclude the possibility of altruistic preference. Given
that, our best strategy for pairing alternatives is as follows:
Suppose we have a situation of S = (x; y) where x denotes the level of own income and
y is other's income. Then, qualitatively, candidate sets of paired situations consist of the
following 8 situations; (x; y+), (x; y¡), (x+; y), (x+; y+), (x+; y¡), (x¡; y+), (x¡; y),
and (x¡; y¡) where x+ means some value greater than x while x¡ describes a value
smaller than x, for example. Since we do not exclude the possibility of altruism a priori,
there are no a priori dominant choices over S in these eight alternatives. We then made
pairs such that these eight situations appear as evenly as possible. We exploited all of
25 potential variations in the survey. Since a respondent answered ¯ve questions for this
task, there are ¯ve di®erent question sets for it. They are assigned uniform-randomly to
respondents. With all these devices, we could e±ciently obtain parameter estimates.
3.2.2 Leyden task
The second task is called Leyden task, which is designed to see how individual characteris-
tics of reference persons a®ect social comparisons. As a ¯rst step of such an examination,
we employ a reference group characterized by age, gender, and educational attainment.
This characterization is borrowed from the Ledyen school de¯nition of reference group.18
Hence, in this task, reference group is not solely the social average. We aim to investi-
gate how intensity (and the sign) of social comparison changes when people face di®erent
characterizations of rivals.
As in the representative agent task, the respondents make a choice among three options:
(i) situation 1, (ii) situation 2, and (iii) do not know/ cannot answer. At the beginning
of this task, respondents are again told to "Imagine that each set on your own monthly
pre-tax income and the other's monthly pre-tax income regulates society's socio-economic
situations." They are also told that, "This time, your rival is not just the social average.
It can be, for example, women who are 28 years old, with a college degree, or men who are
48 years old, with high school degrees." The situations are described by two attributes of
one's own monthly pre-tax income, and monthly pre-tax income of the reference group,
and the rival's individual characteristics: age, gender, and educational back ground.19 It
was also repeatedly stressed that price levels were the same in these two situations, and
respondents were asked to choose the situation that would be best for their own interests.
Respondents repeated ¯ve situation choices, which were de¯ned along these ¯ve di-
17See also Huber and Zwerina (1996).
18The Ledyen school is a group of researchers who initiated the use of subjective well-being as a proxy
of utility. See van Praag and Frijters (1999) for a survey of contributions by the Leyden school. The
school also referred to relative utility and its preferred speci¯cation of reference group being a group of
people of one's age, the same gender, and the same educational attainment.
19Blanch°ower et al. (2009) employed the Leyden school type de¯nition of comparison group, which is
the person's age group for each gender in each nation.
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mensions. After pretests, we determined the levels of these attributes as follows. First,
income variables contain variations of JPY 180 thousands, JPY 240 thousands, JPY 400
thousands, JPY 640 thousands, and JPY 900 thousands, as before. For age, we included
four levels: 22, 32, 45, and 58. These ¯gures re°ect di®erent stages of workers' careers.
Gender includes male and female; for educational attainment, we considered ¯ve vari-
ations of middle school, high school, technical school, under graduate, and graduate.
Hence, potential variations of sets of attributes are 1,000, out of which 25 were chosen
for our survey via orthogonal design.20 We repeat this procedure two times, and paired
alternatives to form 25 choice sets. Our pairing strategy for this task is the same as
in the representative agent task, except that information on three of the socio-economic
characteristics was not taken into account. Since each respondent answers ¯ve questions
for this task, ¯ve question sets were made, and they were distributed in a random fashion
to each subject.
3.2.3 Who compares to whom task
Last task is who compares to whom task, in which we provided two types of reference
group of friend and colleague in choice experiments. We focused on these two groups
after the ¯nding from one of the warm-up questions that these two are dominant among
Japanese respondents (and also among European people, as was shown in Clark and Senik
2010). Then, we have three attributes of one's own income, reference income of friends,
and reference income of colleagues in this task. While we can elicit intensity and signs
of relative utility for friend and colleagues with two-situation-choice framework, as in the
previous tasks, the framework of the choice task has ¯ve options: (i) situation 1, (ii)
situation 2, (iii) situation 3, (iv) situation 4, and (v) do not know/ cannot answer. As
before, the levels of these attributes have ¯ve variations of JPY 180 thousands, JPY 240
thousands, JPY 400 thousands, JPY 640 thousands, and JPY 900 thousands for each
dimension. Since we have three attributes in this task, there are 125 potential variations
in alternative. Orthogonal design was used to pick up 25 out of the 125. We repeated
this procedure four times to form four-situation choice task used in the survey. We paired
these four situations to form a choice set such that we can exploit a tree structure of the
conjoint task. This is documented below. Since a respondent answers ¯ve questions for
this task, there are ¯ve di®erent question sets for it. They are assigned uniform-randomly
to respondents.
We addressed this expanded framework, since thereby we would like to exploit a tree
structure of the choice options. Our purpose is that we investigate if people perceive two
di®erent reference groups as actually di®erent. More speci¯cally, we would like to exclude
a possibility that people de¯ne their comparison benchmark to be merely others, and that
characterization amongst others are not important.
In this task, two attributes of situation 1 and situation 2 are characterized by the
same level of income for colleagues, while one's own income and income levels of friend
are randomly chosen. Regarding attributes of situation 3 and situation 4, the income
level of friend is ¯xed constant while one's own income and income levels of colleague
are randomly chosen. We call the nest of situation 1 and situation 2 C-¯xed, while the
20We used SPSS version 15.0 for orthogonal design.
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second nest of situation 3 and situation 4 is called F-¯xed. For respondents who consider
that only reference income of friends matters, the F-¯xed nest exhibits similarity of the
choice options in the nest. Also, for respondents who consider that only reference income
of work colleague matters, the C-¯xed nest shows equivalence of the choice options in
the nest. With this tree structure, if subjects think that there is no di®erence between
the reference group of friend and that of work colleague - put di®erently, if they think
that both reference groups of friend and work colleague are just taken as others - the tree
structure of the choice options turn irrelevant.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Random utility model
Here we describe our theoretical foundation of the concept of conjoint analysis, but only
for the case of representative agent task due to space constraints. We can easily apply it
to the other two tasks.
Individuals derive utility, not only from their own income y but also from by income
of the social average ¹y. Since each individual cannot choose the levels of income by the
social average, they are considered as regulating utility externality. In this case, the utility
function is generally given by
(1) U = U(y; ¹y);
where U represents the utility function. From textbook assumptions, we suppose that
subjects value attribute y positively. On the other hand, the social average income can be
valued positively (altruism) or negatively (jealousy). Following Johansson-Stenman et al.
(2002), Dupor and Liu (2003), Liu and Turnovsky (2005), we address the constant rela-
tive risk aversion (CRRA) type utility function as
(2) U =
(y¹y°)1¡½
(1¡ ½) ;
where ½ > 0. If ½ = 1, it reduces to log felicity function. The parameter ° is the
central topic of this study and regulates intensity and sign of relative utility. If ° < 0 the
individual has jealousy and ° · ¡1, it means that the Easterlin paradox is valid, since
only relative income matters. If ° > 0, the individual has altruistic preference, whilst if
° = 0, there is no relative utility.
To analyze the conjoint decisions, we use a random utility model framework. Let i
denote alternative i, and n denote respondent n. Then, in order to bring the theoretical
framework to the data, we take the logarithms of both sides in Equation 2 to obtain
(3) lnUni = (1¡ ½) ln yni + (1¡ ½)° ln ¹yni ¡ ln(1¡ ½):
The above expression can be used for estimating parameters via a random utility model
together with an error term ²n. The probability pni that respondent n prefers alternative
i to alternative j is given by
pni = Prob
¡
(1¡ ½) ln yni + (1¡ ½)° ln ¹yni ¡ ln(1¡ ½) + ²ni
> (1¡ ½) ln ynj + (1¡ ½)° ln ¹ynj ¡ ln(1¡ ½) + ²nj
¢
; for all j 6= i:(4)
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When ²n is distributed following independent and identical distribution of extreme value
type 1 (IIDEV1), we obtain a conditional logit model (McFadden 1974). Logit models
estimate the parameters in equation 3 using the maximized likelihood method, with data
from choice experiments.
Here, it should be remembered that estimated variables are divided by the scale pa-
rameter ¾, which is unknown to researchers (Train 2003, p41). Namely,
[e]ach of the coe±cients is scaled by 1=¾. The parameter ¾ is called scale
parameter, because it scales the coe±cients to re°ect the variance of the un-
observed portion of utility. (Train 2003)
We cannot obtain true magnitudes of all the parameters in equation 3, but we can obtain
true estimates of ° by dividing the coe±cient of ¹y with that of y thus canceling ¾ out.
We innocuously assume that ½ = 1 so that we consider log utility functions.21
4.2 Representative agent task
4.2.1 Result of test on the Easterlin paradox
In order to examine the validity of the Eastelrin paradox in Japan from the data of
hypothetical choice experiment, we provide results from the conditional logit model. In the
conditional logit model, it is assumed that the IIA assumption holds: random components
of each alternative are not correlated. We also assume that the random components
within each subject are not correlated. On the other hand, in the mixed logit model
that we address later, these assumptions are relaxed and the distributions of parameters
across subjects are allowed.22 Table 4 summarizes the results for the test of the Easterlin
paradox.
In column (1) of table 4, we see that self income a®ects utility positively and signi¯-
cantly, as is expected. The 95 percent con¯dential interval of the estimate for self income
term lies in the positive domain. That self income a®ects utility positively will validate
our structure of the survey because the results from the hypothetical choice experiments
conform to textbook economic assumptions. Next, it is shown that relative utility does
exist among Japanese respondents, and that the e®ect appears in the form of jealousy
on average from the negative and signi¯cant estimate of reference income term in the
conditional logit model. These two estimates from the conditional logit model provide
the true magnitude for the parameter ° of relative utility, by dividing the second by the
¯rst. From the estimates in column (1), we obtain that ° = ¡0:458. This estimate in-
dicates that the intensity of negative relative utility e®ect among Japanese people is not
21Ida and Goto (2009) tried to compare estimated parameters in a logit model framework by assuming
that ¾ = 1 through all regressions of sub-samples. However, researchers cannot compare estimates from
di®erent sub-samples without taking di®erences in ¾ into consideration. As stated in the body, the
coe±cients that are estimated indicate the e®ect of each observed variable relative to the variance of
the unobserved factors. It is useful to recognize that an LR test designed for con¯rming statistically
signi¯cant di®erence of parameters among sub-groups is not suitable here. For example, a larger ¾ in
a sub-sample leads to smaller coe±cients in its regression, even when the observed factors in two sub-
samples have the same e®ect on utility. A heteroscedastic logit model can be used in investigating the
di®erence of ¾ between the sub-groups.
22STATA module for mixed logit model estimation is provided by Hole (2007).
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as strong as that which validates the Easterlin paradox. To paraphrase Easterlin (1995),
increasing the income of all increases the happiness of all to some extent.23 Hence, it
seems that our result from hypothetical choice experiment stands in the middle of two ex-
tremes: fully relative utility function of Easterlin (1995) and only absolute utility function
of Stevenson and Wolfers (2008). It should be noted here that from the above discussion
on possible direction of bias of estimated relative utility e®ect, we are picking up the upper
bound of the e®ect (in the form of jealousy). We argue that our robust ¯nding here is
that money buys happiness since ° will not exceed one in the absolute value, even after
we take the bias into account.
4.2.2 Who compares most to the social average?
A recent caveat from a happiness study of Clark and Senik (2010) is that comparison
attitudes can di®er, depending on the reference group that people ascribe to their com-
parison benchmark. In our data set, similar to Clark and Senik (2010), information of
speci¯c and relevant reference groups for each subject is available, and it is interesting
to see how people change the intensity of comparison in combination with their relevant
reference groups.
In the representative agent task, the reference group is ¯xed as the social average.
Further, the di®erences of relative utility e®ects derived in this task will re°ect basic
di®erence in the intensity of relative utility across sub-groups, since the focused reference
group has a general concept. The simplest examination here is that we divide our study
sample into sub-groups of individually relevant reference groups, estimating with the
conditional logit framework and comparing obtained true magnitudes of relative utility
parameters across the sub-groups. Columns (2) - (7) in table 4 provide the results.
Column (2) of table 4 shows the estimate of ° for those who have in mind the reference
group of family. While the number of subjects in this category is smaller than the other
sub-groups, except for the one for "others" in column (7), estimates from the conditional
logit model are shown to be signi¯cant at the one percent level, and inferred ° falls just
around the one from whole sample in column (1). An interesting estimate of ° appears in
column (3), in which the in-mind reference group is neighbors. The intensity of relative
utility is the strongest among the sub-groups: people who tend to compare to neighbors
are the most jealous in Japan, while there are not so many of those people. The most cited
relevant in-mind reference group, friends, provides the second strongest jealousy among
reference groups, as is documented in column (4). On the other hand, the second most
cited reference group of work-colleagues in column (5) does not seem to provide strong
relative utility for Japanese subjects. The intensity of relative utility is smaller than
the average, which is surprising when we consider severe intra-¯rm career competition in
Japanese ¯rms. Column (6) shows the result for those who do not compare. It is shown
that they actually compare and they have jealousy just as the other respondents. On the
other hand, the intensity of comparison is the weakest among sub-groups, as is expected.
The last ¯nding will validate our data set and the structure of our choice experiments.
The ¯nding that those who compare neighbors have the strongest intensity of rela-
tive utility draws some attention. The feature of reference group as neighbors will be
23To paraphrase Blanch°ower and Oswald (2004), money buys happiness.
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characterized by close contacts. Hence, the result seems natural if we accept that people
endogenously choose their reference groups from groups of close contacts, as Clark et al.
(2008) argued. However, it is interesting to see a weak intensity of relative utility for
those who compare themselves to another close contacts reference group, work colleague,
in column (6). Regarding this ¯nding, it may make sense to appeal to the tunnel e®ect
conjecture by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973). They argued that the increase of work
colleagues' income could be interpreted as a positive signal regarding likely future out-
comes. The di®erence of relative utility e®ects between the two close contacts reference
groups of neighbor and work colleague in columns (3) and (6) may be explained by the
tunnel e®ect story, while the e®ect is not so strong as providing positive relative utility,
as was found by Senik (2004) for a Russian data set.
4.2.3 Heterogeneity of preference parameters
In column (8) of table 4, we show the results from a mixed logit model, in which distribu-
tions of parameters are allowed. In other words, in the mixed logit model, we can observe
heterogeneity of preference among respondents. Although we assume that the error term
is independently and identically distributed, as in the conditional logit model, the mixed
logit model allows the discrete choice model to apply in the non-IIA situation. Estimates
in the table generally show that our previous results, obtained with the conditional logit
model, are robust. Attributes for self income a®ect utility positively, whereas the reference
income term is picked up as a negative. It is also suggested that the ratios of estimate of
self income term to that of reference income term from the conditional logit model and
from the mixed logit model are very similar, validating the robustness of previous ¯ndings
from the conditional logit model.
Column (9) in table 4 also suggests that the standard deviations estimated in the
mixed logit model may require some attention. In particular, the standard deviations
for self income and reference income terms are both signi¯cant at the one percent level.
This outcome implies that heterogeneity in preference parameters is an important issue.
Especially, the associated standard deviation of reference income term is large compared
to the mean. This implies that there is large heterogeneity in the parameter for relative
utility.
In the literature of behavioral economics, it is well-recognized that demographic di®er-
ences lead to substantial di®erences in preference parameters, such as the time discount
rate and the rate of risk aversion.24 Also, it is natural to expect that sign and intensity of
relative utility depend on individual characteristics, just as it does on in-mind reference
groups.
Following Viscusi et al. (2008), we pick up the e®ects of individual characteristics on
preference parameters by controlling for interaction terms of attributes in the surveys
24Ida and Goto (2009) showed that smokers are endowed with a higher value of time discounting and a
lower value of risk aversion than nonsmokers. Viscusi et al. (2008) showed that eco-conscious individuals
have a lower rate of time discounting than those who are not eco-friendly. Small et al. (2005) applied the
framework of a mixed logit model to investigate the distribution of commuters' preferences for speedy and
reliable highway travel, ¯nding that there was substantial heterogeneity in motorists' values of travel time
and reliability. Hole (2008) investigated preferences of patients over general practitioner appointments
using standard logit, mixed and latent class logit models. He showed that there was signi¯cant preference
heterogeneity for all the attributes in the experiment.
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and demographic variables in conditional logit models. In this paper, we consider two
organic factors, six acquired individual characteristics, and three subjective variables as
potential sources of parameter heterogeneity. Related to the organic variables are the two
variables of age and gender. We consider annual income level, educational attainment,
city dwellings, marital status, unemployment status, and student dummies for individual
characteristics. Three subjective dummy variables include no in-mind reference group
dummy, very happy dummy, and very comparison conscious dummy. Table 5 reports the
results with various dummy interactions.25 Column (2) of table 5 is the benchmark case,
and columns (3) - (6) are presented for robustness checks. We provide column (1), result
of no dummy interactions regression, for readers' reference.
From column (2), we can see that people tend to become more jealous if they are
rich, female, highly educated, or married. Interestingly, city dwellers do not have stronger
comparison attitudes when compared to those who do not live in capital cities. It is also
interesting that age does not a®ect comparison intensity. Regarding subjective variables, it
is shown that those who do not have an in-mind reference group have weaker comparison
attitudes, and that the more they care about comparisons, the stronger their jealousy
becomes. These ¯ndings are as expected, while the feelings of being happier do not a®ect
comparison intensity. These ¯ndings are robust against changes in threshold level for the
Comparison Conscious group, the Happy group, High Income group, and Elder group, as
is shown in columns (3) - (6).26 Thus, we can con¯rm that heterogeneity plays a role in
determining the parameters, just as previous behavioral economics studies have found in
other ¯elds.
4.2.4 Welfare implications of estimated relative utility e®ects
The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress
(CMEPSP), initiated by the President of the French Republic, Nicholas Sarkozy, doc-
umented dissatisfaction with the present state of statistical information about the econ-
omy and the society, especially about GDP measures. The report from the commission
(Stiglitz et al. 2009) considered what additional information might be required for the
production of more relevant indicators of social progress than GDP. The report argued
that they should capture distributional e®ect and relative utility e®ect among others.
From our data set, we can infer the relevance of introducing such additional information
into aggregative measures of economic activity.
First we consider a simple social welfare measure, which can be obtained from informa-
tion of ~y, the average income of all subjects in the study sample, for our benchmark. This ~y
25Note that introducing interaction terms into conditional logit frameworks is ¯ne as long as we con-
¯ne our attentions on the sign and signi¯cance of the interaction terms. See Ai and Norton (2003) for
interpretations of marginal e®ects of dummy interaction terms in logit models.
26Column (2) is the baseline case, where threshold levels of Comparison Conscious, Happy group, High
Income, and Elder are given as category 5 (highest), category 4 (second highest), category 5, and the
age of 53 (75 percent of study sample), respectively. Column (3) is the case in which threshold changes
in subjective variables of Comparison Conscious and Happy into categories 4 (second highest) and 3
(middle), respectively, are allowed. Column (4) is the case where threshold change in High Income to
category 4 is allowed. Column (5) is the case where threshold changes in Elder category to the age of
43 (50 percent of study sample) is tested. Finally, Column (6) is the case where threshold changes in
Comparison Conscious, Happy, High Income, and Elder documented above are allowed simultaneously.
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will be a proxy of a standard per capita GDP measure. In our data set, ~y = 3; 674; 017:446
in Japanese Yen. Now we assume that utility function is given by log form, and per capita
welfare is obtained as
Welfare1 = log ~y = 15:117:
Following the spirit of Stiglitz et al. (2009), we next consider the e®ect of introducing
income distribution into the benchmark measure of social welfare. In this case, the relevant
indicator is the average welfare level of the subjects, which is obtained as
Welfare2 =
P
i log yi
10203
= 14:917;
where i denotes subject index and yi is individual annual income level from the data set.
The reduction of per capita welfare level of 1.33 percent from Welfare1 to Welfare2 is
due to the rightly skewed income distribution. However, against our presumption and
signi¯cance documented in Stiglitz et al. (2009), the magnitude of introducing income
distribution e®ect looks rather minor. Thirdly, we take into account of relative utility
e®ects estimated from the above conditional logit model. Now, the reference group is the
social average, so that we can use the value of ~y. In this case, the per capita welfare,
which is adjusted for relative utility e®ect, is obtained as
Welfare3 = log(~y~y
¡0:458) = 8:193:
As it can be seen from Welfare3, the introduction of relative utility e®ect provided
a major reduction of 44 percent in the per capita welfare, compared to the one from
the standard and previously most cited per capita welfare measure of Welfare1. It is
noteworthy here that the e®ect is much stronger in considering relative utility e®ect than
the one obtained when considering distributional e®ects. Finally, we also allow variations
of relative utility e®ects. Here, we need information of individual parameters of relative
utility °i, which can be obtained using Bayesian Reverse Formula after mixed logit model
estimations (Train 2003).27 Again, the reference group is the social average, and the per
capita welfare which is adjusted for individual relative utility intensity, is obtained as
Welfare4 =
P
i log(yi~y
°i)
10203
= 5:610;
where °i denotes individual parameter of relative utility.
28 Although around 5 percent
of subjects have positive relative utility, altruism, toward the reference group of the so-
cial average, the per capita welfare level, which considers variations in relative utility
27We found that the individual-level estimates of °i are positive for approximately 5% of subjects,
indicating that they are altruistic toward the social average. This ¯nding serves to support the strategies
adopted in theoretical studies on preference externality, such as Liu and Turnovsky (2005), which dealt
with both jealousy and altruism (admiration). A caveat here is that economists may be better served to
think about to what extent jealousy or admiration is pervasive in a macro-economy, rather than to think
about an economy where relative utility is characterized only by a negative or a positive one. In that
sense, the research agenda of Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2008), which considers the heterogeneity
of preference parameters, is more promising.
28We followed the procedure of Revelt and Train (1998) in estimating individual parameters of relative
utility: we ¯xed the e®ect of own income as constant across individuals. See footnote 8 of Revelt and Train
(1998) for details on this point.
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e®ect and income distribution, reduces a further 31 percent from Welfare3 because of
socially dominating jealousy e®ects. In total, the welfare reduction from the Welfare1 to
Welfare4 is as much as 70 percent, outweighing the e®ect of introducing merely income
distribution e®ect. To sum up, between income distribution and relative utility, the lat-
ter plays a more important role in terms of magnitude when we consider improvements
of GDP measures, as is suggested by Stiglitz et al. (2009). Here, we consider merely
cross sectional level e®ects of incorporating additional information to GDP, and we stay
away from the dynamic aspect of it because of data limitations. This is a topic of future
research.
4.3 Leyden task
In the Leyden task, we would like to see how intensity (and sign) of relative utility change
when subjects face reference groups, which are characterized with demographic variables,
not just the social average. We then are able to see how salient the reference group of the
social average was. Following the spirit of Leyden school, we consider reference groups
with individual characteristics of age, gender, and educational background.
Table 6 presents the results from the conditional logit model framework. In all
columns, we pick up the e®ects of types of reference groups by interaction terms of refer-
ence income level and reference group characteristic dummy variables. We created those
dummy variables as follows. Regarding gender, we made a di®erent sex dummy variable,
with information of subjects' own gender and that of reference group in the choice ques-
tions (omitted category is "same gender").29 With respect to age, we created higher age
and same age dummy variables (omitted category is "younger age") from information of
subjects' own age and that of the reference group in the choice questions. Finally, from
the information of subjects' own educational background and that of the reference group
in the choice questions, we created dummy variables of higher education and same educa-
tion (omitted category is "lower education"). These interaction terms are added into the
conditional logit framework in the representative agent task, thereby examining how this
additional information on reference group is salient.
In column (1) of Table 6, we show the result of a conditional logit model estimation
where we do not control for subjects' own individual characteristics on their own income,
reference income, and reference group type dummy interactions. The column shows that
one's own income e®ect is positive and signi¯cant, as with the case of representative agent
task. The partial e®ect of reference income is picked up as negative and signi¯cant, which
is also the same for the case of representative agent task. An interesting ¯nding here is
that we can see the sign and magnitude of relative utility toward speci¯c types of reference
group. As the column shows, people feel strong jealousy if they are facing reference groups
of di®erent sexes (compared to reference groups of the same gender). It is also shown that
reference groups of higher education tend to be a target of stronger jealousy.30 Finally, in
29In the results we provide here, we do not control for asymmetric gender e®ects between men and
women.
30This is the case when compared to the reference group of lower education. The reference group
of same education is also associated with stronger jealousy, compared to the reference group of lower
education, but the intensity of jealousy toward this group is found to be weaker than that of higher
education.
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Japan, if the reference person is elder, it is shown that the feeling of pecuniary emulation
is mitigated. The e®ect of altruism toward an elderly person, or admiration of them, is
comparable to the negative feeling against those with higher education. These intriguing
patterns of relative utility e®ects for di®erent types of relative utility may be a good
re°ection of Japanese cultures.
In columns (2) - (6) of Table 6, we show the result of a conditional logit model
estimation, in which we control for subjects' own individual characteristics on one's own
income, reference income, and reference group type dummy interactions. The creation
of dummy variables for one's own individual characteristics is the same as the cases
of representative agent task regressions in columns (2) to (6) of Table 5.31 From the
columns, we can see the previous result of column (1) is robust to the inclusion of subjects'
own individual characteristics, with respect to higher age dummy and higher education
dummy. Unfortunately, the signi¯cance of the e®ect of di®erent sexes disappears after
the inclusions of one's own individual characteristics. To further exploit this point, we
divided our sample into sub-groups of males and females. Column (7) of Table 6 shows the
result of male samples while Column (8) illustrates the females' case. In both regressions,
interaction terms considered in the bench mark regression (column 2) are controlled.
Those additional regressions for genders suggest that previous results on the e®ects of age
and educational backgrounds of reference groups remain unchanged. Regarding the e®ect
of gender of reference group on relative utility, it is suggested that males feel stronger
jealousy toward people of the same gender than do females, while females feel weaker
jealousy to people of the same gender, females, than do to males. Hence, it is suggested
that males are the target of stronger jealousy.
All in all, from the Leyden task, we can say that the intensity of relative utility changes
in combination with the features of reference groups. Among Japanese respondents, those
with a higher educational background are a target of higher jealousy, and elderly people
tend to draw altruism (or admiration). People with higher educational backgrounds and
elderly people are both associated with higher income, while the relative utility e®ects
toward these two groups go in opposite directions of each other, interestingly. From these
¯ndings, it is suggested that in examining a social setting such as the Easterlin paradox,
it may not be su±cient if we consider the salient reference group to be social averages,
and that features of true reference groups seriously a®ect the outcome of empirical inves-
tigations of the Easterlin paradox.
4.4 Who compares to whom task
In this task, we consider two types of reference groups: friends and colleagues at the same
time, in choice questions. The choice of the reference groups come from the result of our
warm-up question in pre-tests, that these two were the most cited ones among others.
Also, these two external reference groups are brought into focus by Senik (2009). In
addition to the simultaneous treatment of two external reference groups, in this study, we
have information of subjects' speci¯c comparison benchmark (internal reference group),
and we would like to examine the following issues: (i) we investigate if friend and colleagues
are respectively recognized as di®erent type of reference groups, and if so, how di®erent
31See for detail footnote 26.
21
they are; and (ii) we examine if perceptions toward these two groups are di®erent across
subject sub-groups of di®erent speci¯c comparison benchmarks.
In order to investigate these issues, we ¯rst employ a conditional logit model framework
as is shown in Table 7. In the who compares to whom task, there are two external reference
groups, and the true parameters of relative utility toward these two groups are measured
by dividing the estimates of reference income term for friend, and that for work colleague,
with the estimate of own income term, respectively.
The ¯rst column of Table 7 shows the result of conditional logit estimation for the
whole study sample. Firstly, it is shown that one's own income e®ect is found to be
positive and signi¯cant as before, which validates the framework of choice task in this
study. Secondly, the relative utility e®ects toward friend group and colleague group are
both estimated to be signi¯cantly negative, as with the case of reference group of social
average. The di®erence in magnitudes of these two reference groups, however, draws
attention. Looking at the true estimates of relative utility parameters, the intensity of
jealousy toward work colleague group is more than ten times stronger than that of the
friend group. Another interesting ¯nding is that from columns (2) to (7), where estimation
results of sub-sample of individual speci¯c comparison benchmark are provided, relative
utility e®ect toward the reference group of friend disappears in some cases. Especially,
from column (4), for those who think that their reference group is friend, the relative
utility e®ect is not signi¯cant in the conditional logit framework; while from column (5),
for those whose reference group is work colleague, relative utility e®ect toward friend is
signi¯cantly negative. At ¯rst glance, this outcome is a puzzle. Finally, we point out
that the intensity of jealousy toward the reference group of work colleague by those who
answered in the warm-up question that they do not compare is the weakest among sub-
groups (column (6)). Together, with the same ¯nding in the representative agent task, it
will validate our data set.
In order to further investigate the issue of the weak result on the reference group of
friend, we employ a mixed logit model framework. The result is shown in column (8) of
Table 7. Firstly, we obtain very similar magnitudes of estimates on one's own income,
reference income of friend, and reference income of colleague, with the case of conditional
logit model in column (1) and with respect to the means of relative utility e®ect dis-
tributions. This ¯nding is good for the robustness of the previous result. However, the
interesting discovery from the mixed logit model framework is found in standard deviation
terms: while all standard deviation terms for three attributes are signi¯cant, the relative
magnitudes of them compared to their mean estimates are very di®erent. A noteworthy
¯nding is the large standard deviation compared to the mean of the external reference
income term for the friend group. With this ¯nding, we guess that the estimate of ref-
erence income of friend that is close to zero re°ects not only weak average intensity of
relative utility toward the group, but also various attitudes among subjects toward their
friends. In order to obtain intuition on this point, we provide ¯gure 2 where CDFs of
true parameters of relative utility for the social average (°a), for the friend group (°f ),
and for the work colleague group (°w) are illustrated.
32 The ¯gure clearly shows that the
distributions of these true magnitudes of relative utility e®ects exhibit di®erent patterns
32°a is obtained in the representative agent task. We obtained individual parameters of relative utility
using Bayesian Reverse Formula after mixed logit model estimations (Train 2003). See also footnote 28.
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with each other. The CDF of °f shows that all the subjects in our study sample have
negative relative utility, while the CDF of °w shows that more than 20 percent of subjects
feel altruism towards friends. We also see from the CDF of °a that the distribution of °a
has the largest variance, which may be a re°ection of weak validity of reference group as
the social average.
In column 8 of Table 7, we provide the result of mixed logit estimation for the whole
study sample. As was the case of the conditional logit model framework, it is interesting
to see the di®erence of distribution of relative utility e®ects, as well as the intensity of
jealous by separately regressing sub-samples of speci¯c comparison benchmarks. Results
are shown in Table 8. The ¯rst noteworthy thing is that through all sub-groups of speci¯c
comparison benchmarks, the means of the e®ect of one's own income provides quite similar
magnitudes to each other. The means of relative utility e®ects to the friend group are
found to be signi¯cantly negative, except for sub-groups with in-mind reference group of
neighbors who are found to feel altruism toward their friend, on average. For the sub-
groups with in-mind reference group of family, the mean is estimated to be signi¯cant,
but it is only at the ten percent level. In all the sub-groups, the absolute values of
mean estimates of relative utility e®ects are small as before. A noteworthy thing here
is that the estimated standard deviation terms for the reference income term of friend
are large compared to the means. Notice that those terms are signi¯cant for all sub-
groups, including one of the in-mind reference groups of work colleague. The means of
relative utility e®ects to work colleague group are found to be signi¯cantly negative for
all sub-sample regressions. The magnitudes of mean estimates compared to those of one's
own income terms are larger than they were in the case of the reference group of friend.
An intriguing pattern is found when we compare the estimates of standard deviations
of relative utility e®ects to work colleague for two sub-groups of subjects with in-mind
reference groups of friend (column (3)) and subjects with speci¯c comparison benchmarks
of a colleague (column (4)). On the one hand, the standard deviation is found to be
signi¯cant (though it is not so large) in the former sub-group. On the other hand, for
the latter sub-group, the standard deviation is found to be in-signi¯cant, implying that
negative relative utility e®ect against work colleague spikes at the average point among
those sub-samples. This outcome suggests that reference groups of friends and work
colleagues are di®erent, not only in the sense of the average intensities of relative utility
e®ects, but also in the sense of their distributions across sub-sample groups of speci¯c
comparison benchmarks. We argue that this outcome re°ects that 'friend' encompasses
many aspects of life, such as good rivals, persons of understanding, and so forth, and that
work colleagues tend to be regarded as rivals.33
4.4.1 Similarity of reference groups
In the questionnaire for this task, we provided four choice options, since we would like
to exploit a tree structure of the choice options. Our purpose is that we test if people
33As pointed out before in section 4.2.2, regarding work colleague, the tunnel e®ects of signaling future
prospects will have some consequences on the intensity and distribution of relative utility toward work
colleagues, but the result shows that the e®ect does not seem very strong among Japanese subjects.
Card et al. (2010) compared positive e®ects of the tunnel e®ects and negative e®ects of relative utility in
a social experiment setting, and showed that the negative e®ects are dominat in the U.S..
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perceive two of the reference groups as respectively independent. More speci¯cally, we
would like to exclude a possibility that people de¯ne their rivals being merely others, and
that characterization, amongst others, is not important.
In the ¯rst two out of four options, we set the reference income levels of work colleague
as constant, and we call this nest of choice options C-¯xed. Similarly, in the last two out
of four options, we set the reference income levels of friend as constant, and we call this
nest of choice options F-¯xed. For respondents who consider that only reference income of
friends matters, the F-¯xed nest exhibits similarity of the choice options in the nest. Also,
for respondents who consider that only reference income of work colleague matters, the
C-¯xed nest shows equivalence of the choice options in the nest. With this tree structure,
if subjects think that there is no di®erence between reference group of friend and that
of work colleague - put di®erently, if they think that both reference groups of friend and
work colleague are just taken as others, then the tree structure of the choice options turn
irrelevant. If it is the case, from nested logit model estimation, we obtain that Inclusive
Value (IV) parameters related to respective nests are estimated to be signi¯cantly di®erent
from one.34
The results from the nested logit model are as follows. First, IV parameter for the
F-¯xed nest turns 1.556, while that for the W-¯xed nest becomes 1.627. Both of them
are signi¯cantly di®erent from one at the one percent level. These ¯gures indicate that
respondents perceive two reference groups as di®erent to each other, as is expected. Sec-
ondly, an interesting ¯nding here is that estimated IV parameters exceed 1. According
to Train et al. (1987)?from a purely statistical perspective, the value of IV parameters
indicate relative substitutability within and among nests, and if they become greater than
1, it means that choice substitutability among nests are more frequent.35 In our choice
setting, the outcome implies that subjects regard both reference groups of friend and work
colleague relevant and they frequently change their comparison benchmarks from one to
the other, rather than stick to one, in accordance with situations they face. This will be
an evidence which nuances that reference group is chosen endogenously.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper provides evidence from Internet-based, large-scale survey data of hypothetical
choice experiment on the relative utility hypothesis. The methodology exploited here
complements previous empirical results from happiness studies, incentivized choice ex-
periment studies, and neuroscience studies in such a way that methodological problems
among previous studies of these ¯elds are resolved. We show that the intensity of negative
relative utility among Japanese people is not as strong as that which validates the East-
erlin paradox. To paraphrase Easterlin (1995), increasing the income of all increases the
happiness of all to some extent. We clarify the way in which intensity (and sign) of relative
34Previous results of the conditional logit model showed that the magnitudes of relative utility towards
the friend group and the work colleague group are di®erent from each other. Especially, the average
intensity of relative utility for friends was close to zero, suggesting that subjects plausibly distinguish the
friend group and work colleague group.
35See Herriges and Kling (1996) for the relationship between magnitude of IV parameters and global
necessary and su±cient condition of utility maximization behavior in a random utility model framework.
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utility is in°uenced by comparison benchmarks that subjects perceive, and by rivals to
which they are comparing themselves. Stronger jealousy is associated with people who
tend to compare themselves to reference groups of daily contacts. Comparison attitude
toward friends is found to be diversi¯ed, even including altruism for a certain proportion
of Japanese respondents, while comparison attitude toward colleagues is uniformly char-
acterized by jealousy. We also provide empirical evidence, which suggests that a reference
group is chosen endogenously.
Finally, we suggest a future research agenda. As documented above, a merit of the
hypothetical choice experiment framework with a random utility model is that we do
not rely on information of subjective well-being in obtaining true parameters of utility
function with relative concerns. This is a great merit, especially when researchers would
like to conduct international comparisons of relative utility, as usually subjective well-
being information is strongly in°uenced by country ¯xed e®ects. Our future tasks will
be testing the validity of the Easterlin paradox for various countries using hypothetical
choice experiment frameworks.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Elapsed Time in Completing the Survey
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Figure 2: Distributions of Relative Utility Parameters (social average, friend, and col-
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Study sample NIKKEI National Data (b)
Male Female Male Female Pooled Male Female
Age category
20s 18.20 22.18 16.98 21.94 13.73 19.48 18.75
30s 24.53 22.90 25.01 23.14 36.42 24.48 24.06
40s 20.53 24.47 21.37 25.26 30.07 21.78 21.73
50s 23.07 18.61 25.22 19.16 13.88 22.11 22.64
60s 13.68 11.83 11.43 10.50 5.89 12.15 12.82
Education (a) N.A.
Middle school 1.03 0.97 0.94 0.90 18.18 20.80
High school 18.58 25.51 18.38 24.24 41.60 43.39
Some college 10.72 32.75 10.94 33.31 11.36 24.54
College 69.67 40.80 69.77 41.54 28.33 10.67
Marital Status
Single 32.69 26.5 31.65 27.47 29.99 32.00 23.40
Married 63.95 67.24 64.95 66.18 60.66 61.80 57.60
Divorced/separated 3.36 6.26 3.40 6.35 9.35 6.20 19.00
Region
Hokkaido 4.31 4.53 3.97 4.3
Tohoku 4.21 4.37 4.06 7.4
Kanto 45.32 44.79 46.94 32.9
Koshinetsu 3.95 4.14 3.67 6.7
Chubu 10.09 9.98 9.45 11.9
Kansai 20.23 20.33 19.73 16.3
Chugoku 3.92 3.85 3.82 6.0
Shikoku 1.84 1.88 1.90 3.1
Kyushu 6.14 6.14 6.45 11.4
Female [0.1] 52.57 53.03 56.64 51.27
Student [0,1] 3.60 3.16 N.A. 7.60
Unemployment 4.05 2.91 N.A. 4.90
All ¯gures are in percent for each category.
(a) Those who are currently students are excluded from the ¯gure.
(b) Demographic characteristics are from the Population Estimates by the Statistics Bureau (Sep.
2009), Education is from the Employment Status Survey (Table 3; 2007) by the Statistics Bureau,
Marital Status is from the Population Statistics of Japan (Table 6.21; 2008) by National Institute of
Population and Social Security Research, Region is from the Population Statistics of Japan (Table 9.5;
2008), and the unemployment rate is from the Labour Force Survey (Feb. 2010) by the Statistics
Bureau.
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Table 2: "Whose income would you be most likely to compare your own with?"
Family Neighbors Friend Colleague Don't compare Others
Observations 483 578 4279 2024 2592 247
% 4.73 5.67 41.94 19.84 25.40 2.42
Table 3: The Intensity and Direction of Income Comparisons (%)
Comparisons Family Neighbors Friend Colleague Don't compare Others Total
Not at all important
1 2.99 0.47 13.23 8.03 74.33 0.94 100.00
3.93 0.52 1.96 2.52 18.21 2.43 6.22
2 4.14 2.76 24.87 15.17 51.72 1.34 100.00
21.12 11.76 14.33 18.84 49.19 13.36 24.16
3 5.46 5.23 40.16 20.01 26.85 2.28 100.00
33.75 26.99 28.00 29.50 30.90 27.53 29.24
4 4.67 8.39 58.29 24.20 1.10 3.35 100.00
35.20 52.77 49.54 43.48 1.54 49.39 35.65
5 6.00 9.52 54.66 25.26 0.83 3.73 100.00
6.00 7.96 6.17 6.03 0.15 7.29 4.73
Important 4.73 5.67 41.94 19.84 25.40 2.42 100.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
The ¯rst ¯gure in each cell refers to the row percentage and the second to the column percentage.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity of Preference Paremeters (Representative Agent Task)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conditional logit model
Own income 0.048*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Reference income -0.022*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Interaction terms
Own income ¤
High income dummy 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Female dummy -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High age dummy -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High education dummy 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban dummy 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married dummy 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No ref. group dummy -0.006*** -0.003 -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Very happy dummy -0.003 -0.005*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.006***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Very conscious dummy 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Reference income ¤
High income dummy -0.005** -0.006** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female dummy -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High education dummy -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban dummy -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married dummy -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No ref. group dummy 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Very happy dummy -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Very conscious dummy -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 48172 48172 48172 48172 48172 48172
Pseudo R-squared 0.249 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.278 0.279
¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01, ¤ ¤ p < 0:05, ¤p < 0:1. Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses.
Other controlled dummy interactions; survey pattern dummies, student dummies, and unemployment
dummies.
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Figure 3: Supplementary: Images for Hypothetical Choice Experiments
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